dark phenomenology and presence/absence conceptions:

Something to keep in mind is that some phenomenology is relatively more prone to being "misinterpreted" or "misconceptualized," still not committing to any particular thing when using the words "phenomenology," "mistinterpretation," "misconceptualization," etc.

In particular, phenomenology that is "dim," "dark," "black"(!), is not just harder to "see" than gross/overt/bright/clear/something phenomenology or even subtle/low-intensity/low-magnitude that’s not "black." It’s, again, more prone to being misinterpreted/misconceptualized.

"Very dark" or "black" phenomenology sometimes contributes to people, in part, locally, isolatedly, in some part of their "system," "believing" that they’re nothing, or that they’re dead, or that nothing’s there, or the phenomenology itself is nothing, or there’s a black hole "there" that one might get sucked into, and so on.

It might be worth noting that "black" phenomenology is still phenomenology! It’s still present!

As a caveat, this doesn’t mean all "black" phenomenology is "safe" or "harmless" or "the same" as all other "black phenomenology." I mean, it’s definitely safe in some absolute sense, but don’t interact with it mechanically or unresponsively, as per usual! Possibly engage in things like the meta protocol in inclining towards what to do! There’s still a sense in which bad/"bad" things could be lurking/hiding in "the black," in "the dark" (or in bright stuff, too), depending on all sorts of factors.

Again, please don’t "fix"/"stabilize" the meaning of pretty much any word in this section (or in the entire document), but there’s a thing, here.

Additionally, given some relationship between quality and conception, there’s a related thing with conceiving presence and absence.

For example, it’s important to distinguish between (a) not X, (b) the absence/lack of X, (c) the presence of the representation of the absence/lack of X, and so on. Making a light, local distinction between something like "experience" and something like "concept." Conceptualization or experience of the lack of X, which, in some sense, technically, is presence, not absence, may be accompanied by dim, dark, or black phenomenology. (Again, not all dim, dark, or black phenomenology is "the same.")

Example:

lack of belief and/or lack of disbelief is not the same thing as "active/present" disbelief, which might be some combination of feelings, thoughts, "phenomenology," sensations, etc. And some of that might be very dim, dark, or "black."

Note:

There are parallels, here, to "unvalenced" phenomenology and memories. (vs "valenced" as in phenomenology/sensations that is/are directly positive/pleasurable/good or negative/noxious/bad/etc or, more loosely, sensations or experiences that are associated with such.)